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Again, making Tanzania great: Magufuli’s restorationist 
developmental nationalism 
This article is about how ideologies legitimize authoritarianism. The literature 
argues that liberation nationalists discursively construct “liberation” as an 
ongoing struggle and justify their authoritarian rule until its completion. By 
recurrently postponing liberation, they extend this justification of 
authoritarianism. Nonetheless, their claim that the nation is part-way through 
liberation becomes less plausible over time. Liberation nationalism shares a 
discursive structure with a parallel class of developmental nationalisms. I analyze 
the ideology of President Magufuli and CCM in Tanzania. Instead of claiming 
that the nation is mid-transformation, they constructed the status quo as a corrupt 
deviation from a past order: “Nyerere’s Tanzania”. They conceived of this past 
order as a nation dedicated to industrial development which would lead to a 
transformed future. They advocated rupture with the present, the restoration of 
the past and the resumption of this transformative journey. Restorationism 
relieves liberation and developmental nationalisms of the rising rhetorical 
challenge of claiming that the nation has been on a transformative path since 
liberation. Therefore, Magufuli and CCM developed a variant upon liberation and 
developmental nationalisms, which also justifies authoritarianism. Unlike them, it 
remains rhetorically viable as the moment of liberation or development becomes 
distant. I call it restorationist developmental nationalism. 
Keywords: authoritarianism; liberation; development; nationalism; 
restorationism; populism; Tanzania; Africa; ideology; discourse-theoretic. 
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Liberation nationalists in power employ a common rhetorical device. First, they portray 
“liberation” as ongoing rather than achieved.1 Second, they justify their authoritarian 
rule while it continues.2 Third, they recurrently raise the pass-bar for “liberation” and so 
postpone its completion.3 Alex Beresford writes that this makes liberation nationalisms 
potentially “regenerative”;4 they can repeatedly extend their justifications of 
authoritarianism or electoral authoritarianism. However, this regeneration has limits.5 
As time passes, it becomes ever-less plausible that the nation is still mid-transformation 
and has been since liberation. Thereby, the viability of this ideology to legitimize 
authoritarianism wanes. Liberation nationalism shares a discursive structure with a 
parallel class of developmental nationalisms which conceive of processes of 
development rather than liberation.6 
 
In Tanzania, President John Pombe Magufuli was elected in 2015. He and his party, 
Chama cha Mapinduzi (CCM) or “the Party of the Revolution”, developed a creative 
variant on liberation and developmental nationalisms. They instrumentalized this 
ideology to justify a sharp authoritarian turn which began in 2014.7 I analyze the 
discourse they crafted. I adopt the discourse-theoretic perspective of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe and treat ideologies as discourses underpinned by logics of 
articulation.8 Analyzed through this lens, CCM’s reconfigured ideology is united with 
liberation and developmental nationalisms by similarities, but separated from them by 
differences, which turn on the destinations they envisage. Like liberation and 
developmental nationalisms, CCM ultimately imagined a possible future, as yet never 
realized, in which the nation is transformed. However, it also imagined a past order, 
namely “Nyerere’s Tanzania”, which was not static, but in motion, a nation organized 
for and dedicated to development. It constructed the present as a corrupt deviation from 




that old order. CCM advocated the restoration of that past, and thereby, the resumption 
of the developmental path towards the transformed future. Therefore, this discourse is 
simultaneously radical, reactionary and progressive. This backward-looking aspect 
distinguishes it from other liberation and developmental nationalisms. I name it 
restorationist developmental nationalism. 
 
This restorationism makes that variant of liberation and developmental nationalist 
ideologies a possibility, and indeed, a reality, beyond its conventional settings. 
Conventionally, these ideologies are only rhetorically compelling under a small and 
narrowing range of circumstances, but restorationist developmental nationalism is 
rhetorically versatile; it could be employed to justify authoritarianism across much of 
sub-Saharan Africa, and beyond. This is particularly relevant given the contemporary 
African and global authoritarian turn.9 For clarity, I do not claim that this ideology has 
“caused” authoritarian regime survival or re-autocratization in Tanzania, which is better 
explained by CCM patronage and institutionalization,10 state-party merging,11 social 
engineering,12 and the rise of the opposition.13 Discourses give the social world form 
and meaning;14 I argue that through this discourse, people understand CCM’s 
authoritarian rule as legitimate;15 it justifies authoritarianism. 
 
Finally, I contribute to the characterization of Magufuli’s political project, principally 
from 2015 to 2018. Past studies of Magufuli’s project adopt realist-objectivist 
perspectives;16 they presuppose that there is an objective social world17 and focus on 
Magufuli’s “material” policies.18 I complement these realist-objectivist 
characterizations of Magufuli project by interpreting and distilling the ideology through 
which Magufuli and CCM subjectively describe it.19 While past studies of Magufuli 




“material” politics identify continuities with the status quo, I argue that they 
discursively construct a rupture with it. 
 
Researching discourse raises methodological challenges about interpreting meaning in 
context, inferring implicit meaning, distilling coherence from contradictory statements, 
and selecting sources.20 I faced an additional challenge; I am not fluent in Swahili. To 
address these challenges, I studied a wide range of sources.21 I collected the transcripts 
of politicians’ speeches. I drew on a personal archive of more than 2,000 newspaper 
articles selected for relevance, most published between 2013 and 2019. I examined a 
grey literature of official documents. I examined opinions expressed by Tanzanians on 
Twitter, as a participant. This built on extensive field work and 151 interviews I 
conducted for previous research. I relied on three practices to become conscious of and 
respond to any prejudices arising from my subjective perspective and source selection. 
First, I reflected on my positionality and perspective.22 Second, I commissioned 
Tanzanian research assistants to look for further sources which I may have missed, with 
a clear brief designed to minimize bias. For transparency, I mark sources found and 
translated by them with an asterix. All other quotes are reported in the language in 
which they are presented in the sources. Third, I repeatedly conferred with Tanzanian 
analysts of Tanzanian politics, and in particular one academic, four journalists and 
columnists, and one opposition politician.23 I recognize these peers in the 
acknowledgements and attribute points which I owe to their insights in the text. 
 
In the next section, I conceptualize liberation and developmental nationalisms through a 
discourse-theoretic perspective. I compare them to restorationist developmental 
nationalism, which I develop theoretically in the second section. In the third section, I 




locate my study in the Tanzanianist literature. In the remaining sections, I detail the 
restorationist developmental nationalism expressed by Magufuli and CCM. 
 
I wish to clarify three points before proceeding. First, on periodization, many of the 
changes in CCM’s discourse which I describe began in 2011,24 when CCM began what 
it described as “rebranding” after losing ground in the 2010 election.25 However, they 
achieved full expression from 2015 to 2018 during Magufuli’s presidency. Second, on 
attribution, CCM and Magufuli often expressed their discourse in unison. Where they 
do, I refer to them interchangeably; to attribute the discourse to Magufuli’s alone would 
mischaracterize a collective project as an individual one. However, Magufuli took a 
leading role in expressing several aspects of their discourse, including constructing and 
performatively fighting corruption, which I note in the text. For brevity, I do not cover 
the 2019 dissent by marginalized CCM politicians. Third, liberation and developmental 
nationalisms in and out of power may differ. My discussion focuses on them in power. 
Liberation and developmental nationalisms 
African liberation nationalisms differ in principle. The first generation subscribed to 
socialism and won “liberation” in the 1950s and 1960s. The second generation either 
never adopted or subsequently eschewed socialism and won “liberation” violently 
between the 1970s and 1990s, notably in South Africa, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Angola, 
Namibia, and Eritrea.26 The socialists differed in principle too. They were divided 
between an early wave of self-proclaimed “African socialists” and a later wave of 
“Afro-Marxists”.27 Both sub-strains differed in turn; as Joy Hendrickson and Hoda Zaki 
write, there were “many varieties of African socialism”.28 Likewise, Crawford Young 
judged that “the new wave of Afro-Marxist regimes is not homogeneous in ideological 




interpretation or policy practice.”29 Therefore, it is unclear what tenets unite liberation 
nationalisms. 
 
However, liberation nationalisms share a discursive structure. Beresford argues that 
post-Apartheid, South Africa’s African National Congress (ANC) presents liberation as 
“an ongoing (and seemingly infinite) ‘National Democratic Revolution’… which it 
alone is mandated to fulfil.”30 Blessings-Miles Tendi and Sara Dorman argue that the 
Zimbabwe Africa National Union-Patriotic Front (ZANU-PF) imagines a similar 
ongoing liberation and claims unrivalled authority to fulfil a equivalent liberation 
mandate.31 Dorman and others argues that “post-liberation” regimes imagine national 
struggles against foreign enemies,32 especially ZANU-PF.33 Both liberation and national 
struggle underpin exclusionary politics;34 opposition is characterized as seditious either 
because it militates against liberation, or because it is serves foreign enemies, or both.35 
Exclusionary politics also encompasses the delegitimation of “divisive” ethnic 
politics.36 In these pages, Beresford, Marie Berry and Laura Mann offer perhaps the 
clearest synthesis of these studies. 37 They argue that liberation movements construct 
liberation as an incomplete but ongoing transformation. This “liminality” or between-
ness of liberation generates “extraordinary mandates” for liberation parties which 
justifies “authoritarian social contracts” and “political abjection” of their opponents.38 
 
I build on these insights by drawing on the discourse-theoretic perspective propounded 
by Laclau and Mouffe and further developed by Jason Glynos and David Howarth, 
perhaps best known for its conception of populism.39 A discourse, thus defined, 
constructs how the world is and ought to be through logics of articulation. “Logics of 
equivalence” and “difference” construct identities and relate them antagonistically, 




respectively. World-views are partial and fix meaning through sets of “signifiers”. In 
particular, they construct social orders from which a society or nation departs or upon 
which it converges. They function through “fantasmic logics”;40 their contents are 
partially specified and partially unspecified.41 These ambiguities leave room for people 
to invest destinations constructed as desirable and undesirable with their hopes and fears 
or the “beatific” and “horrific” respectively.42 Therefore, the partial specification of 
these social orders is potentially instrumental. 
 
Following Glynos and Howarth, and Benjamin de Cleen, a nationalist discourse 
interpellates a subject as “the nation” and constructs an antagonism between it and “the 
foreigner”.43 Interpreting the liberation nationalist literature through the discourse-
theoretic perspective, a liberation discourse interpellates people as members of a society 
being liberated. It constructs “liberation” as a transformed future through logics of 
fantasy and portrays reaching it as imperative. It portrays the regime as the sole 
legitimate steward of liberation, and invokes that future to deny, depoliticize and 
postpone people’s demands against it.44 A liberation nationalism articulates the two. It 
interpellates a subject as “the nation” being liberated and constructs “liberation” as a 
destination that “the nation” will reach. It denies, postpones and depoliticizes peoples’ 
demands in anticipation of that future. Thereby, it justifies authoritarian measures. 
Finally, it generates an antagonism between “the nation” and their foreign opponents 
that militate against national liberation. It characterizes domestic opposition as foreign 
agents and thereby justifies further authoritarian measures against them. 
 
Liberation nationalism has a developmental twin. James Ferguson, among others, 
argues that developmental discourses imagine futures and deny or delegitimize popular 




demands, like liberation nationalisms.45 Development and nationalist discourses have 
long been combined, just as liberation and nationalist discourse have been. Radika 
Desai conceptualizes “developmental nationalism”,46 which is the subject of a special 
issue of Third World Quarterly. Studied through a discourse-theoretic perspective, 
developmental and liberation nationalisms share a logic of articulation. Exchanging 
“development” for “liberation”, they make equivalent claims. This analysis is derivative 
of prior analyzes; its expression in discourse-theoretic terms is intended to be 
clarificatory. 
 
This logic of articulation is common to African liberation and developmental 
nationalisms. Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa na Kujitegemea, or “socialism and self-reliance” 
is a prime example.47 He construed liberation as an ongoing endeavour to achieve 
socialism.48 He constructed antagonisms with exploitative foreigners.49 He rendered 
criticism and ethnic politics alike as unpatriotic and opposition as seditious by placing 
them in opposition to this socialist mission.50 Similarly, Kwame Nkrumah propounded 
an “African revolution” in-progress against both “indigenous exploiting classes and 
neocolonialists” which would yield a “fundamental transformation of society.”51 This 
discourse-theoretic expression captures an essence behind the “state moving towards the 
future” which Dorman ascribes to many African nationalisms, and the “brighter national 
futures” which Desai ascribes to developmental nationalisms.52 
  
Liberation and developmental nationalisms are not and need not be alike in all other 
respects. Anti-political nationalist discourses construct the nation as united and 
construct ethnic and separatist movements as divisive threats.53 Separatist nationalisms 
imagine peoples denied sovereign statehood by foreign oppressors.54 Nativist 




nationalisms vilify foreign allochthons which threaten national autochthons.55 Each 
such nationalist discourse corresponds to a distinct logic of articulation which could be 
expressed alone or combined with liberation and developmental nationalist logics of 
articulation.56 
  
The rhetorical durability of liberation nationalist discourses - and by extension, 
developmental nationalist discourses - is contested. Earlier accounts speculated that 
demographic change, fading memory of liberation and business capture would give 
liberation nationalist regimes what Dorman calls “expiry dates”,57 limitations which 
Beresford recognized.58 Later accounts claim that their ability to recurrently redefine, 
and therefore repeatedly delay liberation makes these discourses what Beresford calls 
“potentially regenerative”.59 Similarly, Beresford, Berry and Mann argue  “liberation-
ideology is not a time-bound, finite political resource of… ‘heroic’ liberation 
movements.”60 Nonetheless, as the past moment of liberation becomes more distant, and 
nations’ paths digress further from those imagined, it becomes prima facie gradually 
less plausible to claim that the nation is mid-liberation and has been all this time. 
Regimes must recurrently surpass this rising rhetorical bar to sustain these discursive 
claims and therefore maintain the legitimacy of their authoritarian rule. While they may 
succeed in doing so, it will be in spite of this growing void between “the real” and the 
discursive. It is perhaps illustrative that the only remaining regimes which express 
liberation nationalisms were borne of a late wave of violent struggles.61 
Back to the future 
I conceptually develop restorationist developmental nationalism as a variant on 
liberation and developmental nationalist discourses. The distinctiveness of this variant 
turns on the destinations in time which it envisages. While many ideologies construct 




future destinations as yet unrealized, not all do. Following de Cleen, ideologies 
articulated through a “conservative political logic” interpellate people as members of an 
idealized present social order which is under threat.62 Similarly, ideologies articulated 
through a “reactionary political logic” advocate a rupture with the present social order 
in order to reinstate an idealized past order.63 As de Cleen defines them, these mark the 
discursive boundaries of a spectrum of right-wing ideologies. Copious instance of 
“authoritarian nationalisms” from twentieth-century Europe analyzed by Stanley Payne 
exemplify these treatments of the present and past.64 
 
Restorationist developmental nationalism imagines destinations in both the past and the 
future. It constructs a future transformed, as yet unrealized, in utopian terms. It imagines 
a prior order in which national policy was set in pursuit of one goal: the achievement of 
that future. Therefore, this old order represents a trajectory, rather than a final 
destination. This discourse characterizes the status quo as a deviation from that prior 
order. It advocates a rupture with the present to restore the past. Thereby, it proposes the 
resumption of the transformative journey to the future. 
 
This discourse generates two sets of antagonism. On one level, it interpellates “the 
people” as “the nation” and sets them against foreign enemies and their domestic agents 
who militate against the nation’s development. On another, it interpellates “the people” 
as “the plebs” and pits them against illicit beneficiaries of the current (deviated) order. 
This second, vertical dimension of conflict means that restorationist developmental 
nationalism is simultaneously populist, or to borrow a recently-developed sister-
concept, elitist plebeian.65 Defined briefly, populist discourses bifurcate the social 
between “the elite” and “the people”, and vilify the former; elitist plebeian discourses 




trifurcate the social between “the (virtuous) elite”, “the people”, and a middle stratum, 
and vilify the latter.66 De Cleen theoretically develops how populist and nationalist 
discourses can be combined.67 In restorationist developmental nationalisms, a populist 
(or elitist plebeian) discourse is subsumed within a nationalist one; “the people” as plebs 
struggle against an enemy above so that they can resume a developmental journey and 
recommence a grander struggle of “the people” as “the nation” against foreigners. See 
Margaret Canovan on these two meanings of “the people”.68  
 
Relatedly, in this discourse, authoritarian measures are not justified through a populist 
logic as the overthrow of “the elite” and the destruction of liberal institutions which 
deny the “people’s will”.69 By this logic, breaking liberal institutions realizes the ascent 
and representation of the “the people”.70 Instead, it justifies authoritarianism through a 
liberation or developmental nationalist logic as an extraordinary measure which is 
necessary in the context of a vital national struggle and in the pursuit of imperative 
national transformation. The former justifies authoritarianism as the realization of true 
democracy. The latter justifies the suspension of democracy. 
 
Restorationist developmental nationalism differs from liberation and developmental 
nationalisms, which envisage “forward progression” to transformed futures.71 While 
some such discourses imagined futures which incorporated idealized elements of the 
past, such as Nyererean African democracy, Nkrumahist communalism, or Touréan 
communicratique societe, the societies that they set out to create were nonetheless new, 
societies as yet unrealized. Machel’s “new man”72 and Nkrumah’s “new society”73 are 
among the most vivid examples of such forward-looking utopianisms. Restorationist 
developmental nationalisms share this ultimate goal of realizing a transformed future. 




However, like reactionary ideologies they pursue the return to an idealized past,74 albeit 
as only an intermediary junction. 
 
Restorationist developmental nationalisms bears several rhetorical advantages. First, it 
generates antagonisms on several fronts. Second, it carries the radical allure of a rupture 
with the present, the nostalgic anticipation of the past, and the optimistic anticipation of 
the future. Third, it is rhetorically versatile. It relaxes the language of liberation and 
circumvents the high rhetorical bar of claiming that the nation has continuously been on 
a transformative path since liberation. Instead it need only be claimed that once the 
nation followed a transformation path, to which it should return. Therefore, 
restorationism makes the application of this discourse flexible. 
Studying political discourse in Tanzania 
In this paper, I build on studies of Magufuli’s project by Thabit Jacob and Rasmus 
Pedersen, Japhace Poncian, and Sabatho Nyamsenda.75 They describe how Magufuli 
articulates an anti-foreign nationalism; claims to defend the poor; likens himself to 
Nyerere; portrays opposition to it as unpatriotic; and claims the authority to verify truth. 
However, they adopt realistic-objectivist perspectives.76 They presuppose that there is 
an objective social world. Accordingly, they study Magufuli’s rhetoric in relation to his 
“policy measures”77 or “policy interventions”.78 For example, Jacob and Pedersen argue 
that “Magufuli’s interventions… mark not a break, but a continuation of the resource 
nationalism that began under [former president] Kikwete.”79 They argue that changes in 
these policies’ “appearance” and “style” masked these continuities.80 They clarify their 
ontological presuppositions in a later working paper, in which they suppose that 
discourse and material policies necessarily converge “in the long run”.81 By contrast, I 




presuppose that the social world is subjective. Instead of analyzing the policies which 
underpin Magufuli’s project, I interpret how he and CCM characterize it themselves. 
 
CCM revised its rhetoric within a particular discursive context. After structural 
adjustment, CCM had “reconfigured” its discourse.82 It had selectively rejected the 
ideology of Ujamaa. It had shorn socialist and liberation terms from its vocabulary.83 It 
elevated paternity as seniority, providership and (ethnically-harmonious) peace84 in its 
rhetoric.85 It rehabilitated its image for development from 2011 in particular.86 As 
Felicitas Becker, Marie-Aude Fouéré, and Aikande Kwayu all argue, Nyerere and 
Ujamaa remained ever-present in political rhetoric. 87 Most prominently, Fouéré argues 
that Ujamaa and Nyerere became “sites of memory”.88 She stresses that actors drew on 
this shared resource creatively, and in numerous ways. However, she argues that the 
most prominent such way was as a “reservoir of positive moral principles.”89 In other 
words, people invoked Ujamaa as an abstraction, a “shared political language employed 
in the present to articulate conceptions of morality, belonging, and citizenship.”90 I 
argue that under Magufuli’s leadership, CCM drew on Ujamaa and Nyerere in two 
ways, which Fouéré and others recognize but treat as secondary. CCM treated 
“Nyerere’s Tanzania” not as a moral abstraction, but as a discourse from which it 
borrows and as a just and purposeful social order which it imagined and promised to 
reinstate. 
 
In the following three sections, I interpret the restorationist developmental nationalism 
expressed and used to justify authoritarianism primarily between 2015 and 2018. Space 
is scarce, so I focus on the most prominent aspects of this discourse. 




“Following Nyerere’s footsteps” 
CCM, and Magufuli in particular, criticized corruption in government. They used terms 
which were partly moral. Magufuli described “the rot that is in this country”.91 In an 
extension of this putrid metaphor, he promised to tumbua majipu or “lance the boils”. 
Some have characterized this war on corruption as populist which, accordingly, vilified 
“the elite”, namely CCM.92 However, Magufuli did not present CCM as the target of the 
anticorruption drive. Instead, he characterized bureaucrats and businessmen as the 
propagators of corruption. Far from vilifying CCM, Magufuli said that “CCM is here 
and will continue to be here – forever”.93 Therefore, CCM’s message was not a populist 
vilification of “the elite”, but an “elitist plebeian” heroization of “the elite” and 
vilification of a middle stratum.94 
 
This framing was instrumental for CCM, and Magufuli in particular. Opponents of 
CCM had purveyed an image of corruption in government.95  Magufuli’s discourse 
enabled him to accept the widespread allegations of corruption while exonerating the 
party of government. He repeatedly sacked state officials, directors, executives and 
board members. In effect, Magufuli performatively relocated corruption from the party 
to the bureaucracy.96 Further still, Magufuli portrayed his presidency as a cleansing of 
CCM, separating the party from rogue elements within.  Former president Kikwete said 
that CCM was “cleaning up” by removing “traitors” and “saboteurs”.97 With each 
dismissal, implicitly, CCM became cleaner. In 2019, Magufuli appointed a new 
Controller and Auditor General, Charles Kichere. Kichere’s 2020 report sustained this 
portrayal. It reported corruption, but not at the apex of government, but in agencies, 
local administration, parastatals, and foreign missions, which central government might 
arrest.98 





This discourse also equipped Magufuli with a ready-made corruption allegation to 
deploy in internal party struggles. This not only created a pretext to dismiss them but 
discredit them. CCM expelled rumoured presidential challenger Bernard Membe for 
alleged misconduct. Magufuli tacitly suggested that he sacked high-flying cabinet 
members Mwigulu Nchemba and January Makamba for corruption and 
underperformance respectively. Similarly, this agenda created a ready-made script to 
deflect blame from the president and party to individuals. Magufuli sacked cabinet 
ministers Sospeter Muhongo, Charles Tizeba, Charles Mwijage and Kangi Lugola, 
among others, as part of performed interventions in scandals and crises. 
 
 
Magufuli presented his actions as a rupture rather than gradual change. He theatrically 
fired officials for corruption and laziness on-the-spot. He dismissed 10,000 civil 
servants for falsifying transcripts.99 Magufuli portrayed the present order as potentially 
ruinous, and concomitantly, the changes which they advocated as literally vital. 
Magufuli said that “The measures I am taking are aimed at saving this country.”100 
Therefore, whether or not CCM’s policies featured continuities with the status quo, they 
were presented as a fundamental break with it; policy and discourse differed. 
 
This rupture involved a reinstatement of Nyererean virtues, notably work, thrift and 
“thinness”. These virtues were expressed through the performed elimination of their 
constructed opposites, namely laziness, largesse, and greed. However, they are also 
expressed positively. Magufuli’s 2015 campaign slogan was “hapa kazi tu”, or “only 
work here”. Similarly, Magufuli reduced salaries, cabinet-size and government air-




travel. In these respects, CCM’s restoration invoked Nyerere as a “language of 
morality”, consistent with Fouéré and others.101 
 
For context, these claims were challenged by opposition and civic voices. At first, they 
alleged that the new anti-corruption drive focused on petty corruption and spared CCM 
grandees.102 Later, they alleged that Magufuli’s appointments were nepotistic.103  
 
CCM also wove a reinstatement of morals, portrayed as “traditional”, into this 
restorationism. It took theatrical action against after-hours drinking, shisha-smoking, 
underage pregnancy, birth-control, LGBTQ peoplei and drugs.104 These issues were not 
prominent aspects of Ujamaa, but they gained definition in contrast to a constructed 
liberal morality supposedly imposed by foreigners. For example, it was alleged that 
INGOs promoted homosexuality.105 By defending LGBTQ rights and female 
reproductive rights, donors and INGOs reinforced these associations.106 
 
However, the centre-piece of this self-portrayed restoration was the revival of a project 
of national transformation.107 Industrialization received pride of place in CCM’s 
National Five Year Development Plan 2016/17-2020/21.108 This restorationist project 
integrated many CCM policies. Instead of focusing on these policies’ content, I focus on 
how CCM discursively presented them as a return to Nyerere’s Tanzania. At the 
inauguration of the 11th Parliament, Magufuli declared that “there is no other way but 
industrialization.”109 Ujamaa concentrated primarily on rural development rather than 
urban. Nonetheless, industrialization was characterized as Nyerere’s project. For 
 
i Typically they refer to “gays” or “homosexuality”. 




example, one deputy minister said that the government’s actions “showed the effort to 
implement Mwalimu Nyerere’s agenda of the industrial economy.”110 
 
This elevation of industrialization was accompanied by an extension of state economic 
intervention. The Five Year Plan is replete with such proposals.111 CCM presented 
privatization as part of the drift of the status quo. Magufuli said that “we privatized even 
strategic industries like the railways corporation. It’s like we decided to leave each and 
everything to investors, which was wrong.”112 Likewise, CCM portrayed the re-
assertion of the state as a return to the past.113 This had a basis in historical record, but 
CCM belaboured the parallels. Altogether, it selectively remembered aspects of the past 
by lamenting abandoned policies and celebrating policies to be revived. 
 
CCM promoted several projects as emblems of this so-called resumption of Nyerere’s 
project. First, CCM restarted the transfer of government to Dodoma.114 Nyerere and his 
party had designated Dodoma as the capital and resolved to relocate government 
ministries there, but had only partially done so. Magufuli said: 
the Father of the Nation [Nyerere], in 1973, said let us move to Dodoma... We are 
moving to Dodoma and I am about to finish-up [transferring my office there].115 
Therefore, he expressed his intention to literally complete a project which Nyerere had 
begun. Senior CCM politician Pancras Ndejembi said that by moving to Dodoma, 
“Magufuli is following Nyerere’s footsteps”.116 
 
Second, Air Tanzania Company Limited (ATCL), bought a Boeing 789 Dreamliner and 
several smaller airplanes. CCM characterized this as the revival of the national airline, 
which was founded in 1977 under Nyerere. A government spokesperson said that “The 




787 Dreamliner will be the flagship aircraft as we renew and grow the Air Tanzania 
fleet [emphasis added]”.117 Magufuli said that “We have restored ATCL to bring back 
our national reputation [emphasis added]”.118 Accordingly, the arrival of the Dreamliner 
was greeted with pomp and ceremony.119 Similarly, CCM revived the long-dormant 
Stiegler’s Gorge hydro-dam project.120 Barnaby Dye analyzes its wider ideological 
significance.121 Magufuli described this as a dream conceived of in the 1970s; he 
promised to fulfil it and, tellingly, re-named it “Nyerere Gorge”.122 Likewise, CCM 
commissioned a series of standard-gauge (high-speed) railways, which invited parallels 
with the Ujamaa-period Tanzania-Zambia TAZARA Railway. 
 
Thereby, CCM constructed these projects and policies as signifiers of the restoration of 
Nyerere’s plan. At a staged meeting with Nyerere’s widow, Magufuli said “Everything 
that the Father of the Nation wished to do, like Stiegler’s Gorge, self-reliance, we see its 
result when we try to do it”.123 He continued “if you read the Arusha Declaration, you 
realize…everything that our country was supposed to build is in there”.124 Therefore, 
CCM invoked Nyerere not primarily to express moral principles, as Fouéré described 
others doing in the past, but as a constructed policy agenda, selectively remembered, 
which it was reinstating. Few objected to the restoration of “Nyerere’s Tanzania” in 
principle.125 However, for context, the opposition portrayed its tax initiatives as short-
termist and its plane-buying as improper and imprudent.126 
 
“Nyerere’s Tanzania”, “Nyerere’s plan”, “Nyerere’s footsteps” and other synonymous 
terms became signifiers for a past social order which encompassed this programme. 
This discourse has been enriched and sometimes complicated by other voices. In 2018, 
the hashtag #MATAGA gained prominence Twitter, an acronym for “Make Tanzania 




Great Again” in imitation of Donald Trump. One active advocate of Magufuli, whose 
true identity remains unknown,127 tweeted: 
#MATAGA MAKE TANZANIA GREAT AGAIN! Tanzania was great before the 
grand corruption destroyed the country.128 
A more accurate expression of CCM’s own discourse would be that it was resuming the 
task of making Tanzania great; it was, again, making Tanzania great. 
“New Tanzania” 
 
In CCM’s revised discourse, industrialization had a purpose and the nation had a 
destination. Magufuli said “I am steering the country in the right direction. I believe we 
would reach there and achieve our goal.”129 Likewise, “Nyerere Dam” would help “to 
reach where we are destined”.130 This national destination was “to be an industrial 
country”.131 Therefore, restoration of the past recommenced a journey to the future. 
However, a new term became especially prominent CCM’s vocabulary in 2018 which 
signified this destination: “Tanzania Mpya” or “New Tanzania.” 
 
The contents of this destination were specified in bureaucratic detail. The Five Year 
Development Plan brims with specific interventions and lists of targets. However, it 
remained only partially constructed in public-facing rhetoric. CCM repeatedly stated 
that through industrialization, Tanzania would “produce mass jobs”132 and “elevate the 
living standards of Tanzanians”.133 Justice, equality and the end of exploitation were all 
absent from these goals; therefore, like other re-imaginations of the Ujamaa,134 this 
restoration shore it of socialism, as opposition politician Zitto Kabwe stressed.135 
 




While these goals might seem mundane, they were construed as metamorphic. CCM 
privileged projects like Stiegler’s Gorge and Air Tanzania which evoke modernity. Both 
dams and planes involve the conquest of humankind over nature, the first by reshaping 
landscapes, the second through human flight.136 These two items became objects of 
fantasy. #MATAGA was coupled to another Twitter hashtag, #NiSisiSisi, an 
abbreviation of “Sisi ni Tanzania Mpya”, or “We are the New Tanzania”. Many users 
produced and tweeted images of Dreamliner planes carrying this hashtag.137 Others 
tweeted images of gleaming industrial plants.138 They illustrate ways in which people 
imagined “New Tanzania” through and in association with these symbols. CCM 
encouraged these utopian imaginaries. Magufuli said of the Dreamliner “the developed 
Tanzania, the respected Tanzania, the prosperous Tanzania is coming.”139 
 
The realization of national development was presented as an imperative which 
transcended other political considerations. In this context, “only work here” took on a 
different meaning; it represented not only virtue, but dedication to this cause. Magufuli 
justified the curtailment of officials’ amenities by declaring “we must make 
sacrifices.”140 Similarly, Magufuli postponed popular demands as he castigated a public 
rally; “government obligation is to provide… roads and supplying medicine, not relief 
food for lazy people”.141. 
 
In sum, CCM constructed the present as a corrupt and deviant status quo and the 
Ujamaa period as a past order which Tanzania should reinstate. This restoration 
involved resuming the endeavour to create “New Tanzania”. 





Like other developmental and liberation nationalisms, CCM coupled the imagination of 
a transformed future with a national struggle against mabeberu or “imperialists”. 
Kikwete’s cordial approach to miners had contained moments of hostile rhetoric. 
However, Magufuli’s rhetoric became bellicose and he initiated far-reaching mining 
reforms in 2017. These reforms followed the direction of travel charted by Kikwete.142 
However, Magufuli portrayed them not as a continuation of policy, but a rupture with it. 
They oversaw the alleged discovery of underreported mineral exports by Acacia 
Mining. They constructed it as a moment of national revelation. Magufuli presented this 
as evidence of “unbelievable levels of looting and loss of government revenue”.143 He 
tied it to contemporary corruption; “everything we privatize, we enter into joint 
ventures, we partner with fraudsters.”144 This became a pretext for mining reforms, 
which he located in an “economic war”.145 The opposition claimed it yielded nothing.146 
 
CCM subsequently broadened this frontier of foreign enemies. Magufuli said that some 
donors “do not want good to our country”.147 Moreover, while discussing electricity 
investors, he imagined the following anti-industrial extortion: 
If national electricity is controlled by other people, you are finished… they may 
decide that today we raise bills or we cut the power… it means all industries you 
build will stop.148 
Amid the mining dispute, the Finance Minister borrowed another phrase propagated on 
Twitter which alluded to Trump; he presented a “Tanzania First Budget”.149 
Altogether, CCM suggested that exploitation by companies frustrated industrial 
development. Asserting  sovereignty over natural resources was incorporated into the 
restoration of Ujamaa.  





CCM invoked both industrial development and national struggle to justify 
autocratization. Tanzania became an electoral authoritarian regime after the transition to 
multipartyism in 1992.150 CCM began reintroducing further authoritarian measures in 
2014.151 CCM construed criticism as divisive and opposed to peace. Thereby, it 
delegitimized criticism.152 For example, in anticipation of criticism by churches at 2018 
Easter Sermons, Magufuli said “I call on religious leaders…to maintain peace…for the 
country’s development.”153 CCM had routinely expressed messages through this logic 
of articulation in the recent past.154 However, in its revised discourse, CCM employed a 
similar logic to associate patriotism and development with criticism and treachery. 
CCM construed itself as in service to national development. Magufuli asked Tanzanians 
to “support the steps I am taking because it is for our national interest”.155 Accordingly, 
criticism of CCM or its project harmed the nation, and so was unpatriotic. Magufuli said 
“Patriotism is being lost…I request the press to put Tanzania first… when Tanzania is 
damaged, you will also be damaged.”156 CCM compounded the severity of these 
associations by locating Tanzania in the aforementioned struggle against foreign 
opponents and making the threat to Tanzania existential. Earlier in this speech, 
Magufuli said “someone said here that there are those who would like to see Tanzania 
destroyed”.157 Therefore, criticism was not just unpatriotic, but seditious. Magufuli said 
that critics who disputed national statistics “want to derail us from our resolve to build 
the economy”.158 This closely followed the logic of articulation by which liberation and 
developmental nationalisms delegitimized criticism. 
 
By a similar logic of articulation, CCM elevated “development” above “politics”. 
Magufuli said that “We should put Tanzania first and politics later. Tanzanians need 




development.”159 This enabled CCM to narrow the legitimate realm of opposition 
activity. Magufuli said that “They [the opposition] should let us implement CCM’s 
election manifesto and judge us after five years”.160 This depoliticized government and 
rendered opposition outside elections as unpatriotic and illegitimate.161 Similarly, CCM 
characterized opposition as treachery by connecting it to foreign enemies against whom 
the government was struggling to achieve development. After the revival of ACTL was 
frustrated by the seizure of a new aeroplane in Canada, a government spokesperson said 
that opposition politicians were “cooperating with foreigners to sabotage the 
implementation of several development projects.”162 Indeed, opposition politicians were 
charged with sedition for encouraging the seizure.163 This complemented a long-
standing aspect of CCM discourse whereby ethnic opposition was characterized as 
divisive and a prelude to civil strife.164 Thereby, the antagonisms and goals that CCM 
constructed through its restorationist developmental nationalism were used to justify 
authoritarianism and delegitimize opposition.165 Therefore, they gave developmental or 
liberation nationalist, rather than populist, justifications for authoritarianism, made in 
reference to transformation and foreign enemies, not “the elite” and liberal institutions 
which defy the “People’s Will.”166 Opposition and civic actors contested CCM’s 
discourse. They characterized Magufuli as a paranoid tyrant.167 Worse, they suggested 
that his tyranny fomented division which forsook Nyerere’s legacy of peace.168 
Conclusion 
Altogether, CCM resurrected a discourse which bore many similarities in discursive 
structure to liberation and developmental nationalisms. It constructed industrial 
development as a destination in the future towards which the nation was bound. It 
interpellated people as nation and generated an antagonism between it and foreigners 
who frustrated development. It invoked the imperative of development and the threat of 




foreigners to justify authoritarian measures, and vilified criticism and opposition as 
unpatriotic and seditious. Through this discourse it justified and continues to justify the 
constriction of political and civic space. 
 
CCM did not contend that Tanzania has been continuously developing since 
independence. On the contrary, it embraced the claim that the nation has strayed from 
its developmental trajectory and promised to restore it. Thereby, it circumvented the 
rising rhetorical bar which liberation and developmental nationalisms must surmount. 
Restorationism makes developmental and liberation nationalisms versatile. Of course, 
this raises another question for future research: how will restorationist developmental 
nationalists in turn be judged if they do not realize the transformations they promise? 
Will one generation of restorationists replace another ad infinitum? 
 
As I was making the final revisions to this article, Magufuli’s initial response to 
COVID-19 was unfolding. He speculated that government health officials were on the 
“payroll of imperialists”.169 By alleging both foreign conspiracy and domestic 
collaboration, he subsumed his interpretation of COVID-19 into his nationalist 
discourse. However, he also called COVID-19 a “devil”. This emergent frame 
illustrates the creativity and variability of Magufuli rhetoric; ultimately, he crafts it, and 
he can break with it. 
 
Restorationism represents a possible future of liberation and developmental ideologies 
in sub-Saharan Africa and beyond, a means for them to rejuvenate their discourses. In 
South Africa, counter-discourses had claimed that the ANC had betrayed its liberation 
mission by capitulating to big business or succumbing to elite corruption. President 




Cyril Ramaphosa promised to partially turn back the clock in two ways; he would “turn 
the tide of corruption” and “reindustrialize”.170 Thereby, South Africa would (re)embark 
upon a “new path” to become a “new country”.171 Others not only construct such 
discourses but justify authoritarianism through them. Zimbabwe’s ZANU-PF had 
articulated an emblematic liberation nationalism.172 Opposition voices had long-narrated 
it’s deviation from liberation ideals.173  Emmerson Mnangagwa became president in a 
military coup entitled “Operation Restore Legacy”.174 Coup-leaders claimed that some 
ZANU-PF leaders had betrayed liberation principles and justified the coup as a 
“restoration” of them.175 This restorationism enabled Mnangagwa to both be a “change 
candidate” and use aspects of his predecessors’ liberation nationalism to justify 
authoritarianism.176 
 
Beyond contemporary liberation nationalist regimes, almost all sub-Saharan African 
countries have historic developmental or liberation nationalist movements. Nostalgia for 
post-colonial moments could induce others to develop restorationist developmental 
nationalisms; by degrees, some already have. In Malawi, President Bingu wa Mutharika 
imagined a past era of “discipline” under one-party President Kamuzu Banda.ii He 
constructed the subsequent loss of =“discipline” =and portrayed his own presidency as 
restorationist. He chastized officials and literally edified Banda in monuments.177 This 
accompanied authoritarian measures. Justifying Banda’s actions, and implicitly, his 
own, he said “Sometimes discipline can be mistaken for dictatorship.”178 
 
 
ii I am entirely indebted to Calum Fisher for this example. 




Looking forward, researchers should consider how others look back. As postcolonial 
moments grow distant, Africans have growing latitude to idealize the past without 
reaching into precolonial history. Political nostalgia for the postcolonial period merits 
further academic attention. Researchers should interpret how Africans re-remember 
history and draw on it to imagine possible futures. More broadly, in and beyond sub-
Saharan Africa, studies of political discourse should privilege the destinations that 
discourses envisage. Thereby, they can explore the connections between 
authoritarianism and utopianism. 
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